BCH Group's Chen Zhi has entered and exited Taiwan more than 10 times! The director of the National Police Agency: The FBI has intervened, and the Taipei District Prosecutors Office is investigating.

The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on the Prince Group of Cambodia for being a transnational criminal organization. The list includes 3 Taiwanese individuals and 9 companies registered in Taiwan. The chairman of the Prince Group, Chen Zhi, who is wanted for prosecution, has entered and exited Taiwan at least 10 times. Police Chief Chang Jung stated that there has been proactive contact through the FBI, and the case is currently being directed by prosecutors from the Northern District Prosecutor's Office.

3 Taiwanese individuals and 9 Taiwanese companies sanctioned by the US

The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on Cambodia's BCH Group, with three Taiwanese individuals and nine companies registered in Taiwan appearing on the list, causing shock within Taiwanese society. Legislative member Huang Jie pointed out during the Internal Affairs Committee inquiry that the recent joint prosecution of BCH Group’s Chen Zhi by the U.S. and U.K. was surprising, but what shocked her even more was that Chen Zhi has entered and exited Taiwan more than 10 times to date, and that the nine companies registered in Taiwan and three Taiwanese individuals are all listed on the sanctions list. Has Taiwan received any relevant international intelligence?

What role do these Taiwanese individuals and companies play in the BCH Group network? Although the specific list and functions have not been fully disclosed, the U.S. OFAC sanctions list typically includes individuals directly involved in criminal activities, intermediaries providing financial services, and shell companies acting as channels for fund transfers. Nine Taiwanese companies may have been used for money laundering or fund transfers, moving the proceeds of fraud from Cambodia to Taiwan or other regions.

The depth of involvement of the three Taiwanese individuals is a key issue. Are they core members of the BCH group, or merely peripheral personnel providing technical or financial services? Did they actively participate in the crime, or were they used without their knowledge? These questions require in-depth investigation by Taiwanese law enforcement agencies. If active participation is confirmed, they will face serious criminal liability; if they were merely used, they will still need to bear the responsibility for regulatory negligence.

The consequences of Taiwanese companies being listed on the OFAC sanctions list are extremely serious. This means that any U.S. individuals or entities are prohibited from engaging in transactions with these companies, and violators will face criminal prosecution. More importantly, international financial institutions, in order to avoid the risk of secondary sanctions, typically proactively sever ties with sanctioned targets. The bank accounts of these Taiwanese companies may be frozen, cross-border payment channels cut off, effectively amounting to being expelled from the international financial system.

This is a significant blow to Taiwan's market image and the credibility of its financial regulation. The international community may question the effectiveness of Taiwan's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing mechanisms, wondering why so many companies and individuals are allowed to participate in transnational criminal networks. Such skepticism could affect Taiwan's position in international financial organizations and even influence financial cooperation with other countries.

Chen Zhi was not discovered entering Taiwan at least 10 times before 2022

The chairman of the BCH Group, Chen Zhizeng, has entered and exited Taiwan at least 10 times, a fact that raises serious questions about Taiwan's border control. Zhang Rongxing responded that preliminary data shows that Chen Zhizeng's entries and exits to Taiwan were likely before 2022, and he has not been detected entering Taiwan since then. This time point is noteworthy, as 2022 is when the BCH Group began to attract international attention, and Chen Zhizeng may have realized the risks and ceased entering Taiwan.

At least 10 entries and exits indicate that Chen Zhi has close ties with Taiwan. What are the purposes of these entries? They may include meeting with Taiwanese accomplices, handling fund transfers, or establishing money laundering channels. If Chen Zhi engages in criminal activities every time he enters Taiwan, and the Taiwanese law enforcement agencies are completely unaware, this exposes a serious intelligence gap.

Why was Chen Zhi able to enter Taiwan 10 times without being detected? Possible reasons include: using a fake identity or altered passport, transiting through a third country to evade tracking, the lack of real-time intelligence sharing mechanisms between Taiwan and Cambodia, or Chen Zhi had not yet been designated as a key monitoring target by international law enforcement agencies before 2022. Regardless of the reason, it reflects the loopholes in border control.

The inquiry by Green Committee member Huang Jie pointed directly to the core issue: Did Taiwan receive relevant international intelligence? Zhang Rongxing's response indicates that this case was initiated unilaterally by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of the Treasury for prosecution and sanctions. Before initiating this action, they did not request the Taiwanese side to provide relevant information. This kind of unilateral action may have two explanations: one is that the U.S. believes Taiwan may have leaked information or is insufficiently cooperative, choosing to conduct a secret investigation; the second is that the case is progressing extremely quickly, leaving no time for international coordination before taking action.

Regardless of the interpretation, it shows that Taiwan is in a passive position in this transnational crime case. The National Police Agency proactively contacted the FBI and reported to the prosecutors of the Northern District for investigation, which is a remedial measure after the fact, rather than a preventive one. If Taiwan had a closer intelligence-sharing mechanism with the United States, it might have arrested Chen Zhi upon his entry into Taiwan, rather than starting the investigation only after he had escaped.

Zhang Rongxing promised to monitor capabilities, but confidence is in doubt

As for whether there is a way to detect similar individuals entering and exiting Taiwan in real-time, Chang Rongxing said that it should not be a problem if the individuals are known to the National Police Agency in advance. Regarding their entry and exit and any suspected illegal activities they may engage in after entering, “we have the capability to monitor and handle it.” He assured that the National Police Agency will do its utmost to combat fraud.

The key to this response lies in the premise of “prior knowledge.” Chang Rongxing emphasized that if the National Police Agency had prior knowledge of the target, they would have the ability to monitor and handle the situation. However, the issue lies in the source of the “prior knowledge” intelligence. The BCH Group case shows that Taiwan did not have prior intelligence on Chen Zhi's criminal activities, allowing him to enter and exit freely 10 times without being detected.

Taiwan's border control system theoretically has interception capabilities. The verification of licenses upon entry, biometric identification, and comparison with Interpol's red notices are all standard procedures. However, the effectiveness of these systems depends on the timeliness and completeness of intelligence. If international law enforcement agencies do not place someone on the wanted list, or if Taiwan does not receive advance warning intelligence from other countries, the border system will not be able to function.

Zhang Rongxing promised that the National Police Agency would do its utmost to combat fraud, but such a commitment is difficult to fully restore trust under the circumstances where Chen Zhi has already fled and damage has been done. Legislators and the public are more concerned about how to prevent similar situations from happening again. Taiwan needs to establish a more proactive intelligence gathering mechanism, rather than passively waiting for notifications from other countries. Cooperation in law enforcement with Southeast Asian countries, especially Cambodia, needs to be strengthened, as the region is a hotbed for transnational crime.

The United States and the United Kingdom have recently joined forces to crack down on the largest cryptocurrency fraud case in history, seizing over $14 billion in Bitcoin and filing telecommunications fraud and money laundering charges against Chen Zhi, the founder of the BCH group. This case not only involves transnational financial crimes but also implicates forced labor and human trafficking, highlighting the breadth and depth of the BCH group's criminal activities.