Pop Mart and Moutai, who do you think is more promising?

Pop Mart and Moutai, both have experienced significant pullbacks and have recommendations from Yongping Duan. Recently, they are often discussed together.
Many people say, Pop Mart also has the right to compare with Moutai? What I want to say is, you might not understand Pop Mart, and you may not necessarily understand Moutai.
On the surface, Pop Mart is a new brand; when it comes to moat, it seems unworthy to even compare it to Moutai. Because Moutai is a symbol; in some scenarios, it is a necessity. It doesn’t need to do anything extra; just produce and it can earn so much money every year.
In contrast, Pop Mart is a high-maintenance type, meaning I need to constantly sign new artists, release new IPs, and be able to follow up with a previous IP that has lost its heat—that kind of uncertainty doesn’t seem very stable.
So, Moutai’s P/E ratio has come down, and many dare to bet. They think, “High-dividend stocks with lower P/E ratios are attractive because of the dividend yield. At worst, over 10 or 20 years, I can steadily collect dividends. Where else can I find such a good financial product?”
But when Pop Mart’s P/E ratio drops, they don’t dare to bet because it’s not “stable” enough.
But is Moutai really stable enough? Past experience doesn’t guarantee the future. The dividend yield increases on the premise that Moutai can still earn that much money each year. What if it can’t? Then the current P/E ratio doesn’t indicate any problem because what you see as “cheap” is fake.
The biggest problem Moutai faces is the shrinking of the entire baijiu market on the consumer end, and the contraction of its “necessity scenarios”—this isn’t its problem but a macro issue, a change in social cooperation patterns.
Its seemingly bottomless moat makes its decline slower than other baijiu brands, but the trend is inevitable.
And as a “financial product,” the biggest risk is “not preserving value,” because once that happens, the liquidity that was locked in will be released, and it can no longer maintain the high premium when liquidity was locked.
Even if that liquidity doesn’t enter the market and is just consumed internally, it only looks sustainable temporarily. In fact, it has already overdrafted the potential future consumption scenarios for Moutai—this is like eating tomorrow’s grain today, which is useless.
That’s why I say, “It looks cheap now, but when it’s no longer profitable in the future, this ‘cheapness’ is fake.”
Many also misjudge Pop Mart’s moat.
It’s correct that Pop Mart needs continuous investment in developing new IPs; whether it can produce Labubu again is uncertain, which is also correct.
But many people don’t realize three points:
First, macro conditions are unfriendly to Moutai but very friendly to Pop Mart. The overall baijiu consumption scene is shrinking, while trendy toys are the opposite.
Second, Pop Mart’s long-tail effect is very strong. Whether it’s Molly, Labubu, or other flagship IPs, even if social discussion wanes, they continue to sell for many years and grow.
This means that it’s not that new hits can’t generate high heat, and the company is doomed. Old IPs or what many consider “faded IPs” are still growing in sales.
Third, do you think it’s just luck that produces super IPs like Labubu, with stars boosting it, or that the image is loved by many? Actually, no. It has already mastered a set of industrialized aesthetic-leading processes, such as distributed testing, heating up IPs with good data, and then channeling resources into a racing mechanism to produce winners, packaging them with a bunch of peripherals and stories, creating buzz, and leading social topics.
Honestly, do you really think Labubu’s sharp-toothed monster looks good? When I first saw it, I thought, what is this thing? But once Labubu’s data came out, it could use ubiquitous social topics to make you feel like you don’t have one, that you’re out of the discussion, that you lack the aesthetic appreciation for it. That’s being outdated, having poor aesthetic judgment, and not understanding the story behind it.
This is the ability to create viral hits. I even spent over ten thousand yuan on Labubu. Now looking at these, I think they’re quite beautiful—beauty and ugliness are not subjective but social projections, given by stories, others’ evaluations, societal standards, and emotional value.
What are your friends saying? How do you want to fit into the environment? Your standards of beauty and ugliness are shaped by society.
Edison Chen, Louis Koo, Daniel Wu, Leehom Wang—where are they handsome? Tell me, where? Why? What about their features, the golden ratio of facial features, symmetry, facial folds, small head, big head, narrow face, wide face—even body weight—is a societal standard imposed on you. You think it’s your own subjective aesthetic?
Pop Mart can influence your judgment of beauty and ugliness—first aim, then shoot, instead of testing repeatedly whether it can hit the bullseye next time by luck.
Don’t argue, don’t say “I just don’t think Labubu looks good,” such low-IQ comments. Pop Mart’s success doesn’t need you to contribute; influencing a large part of people is enough.
It needs a macro data perspective. Whether you’re involved or not, no one cares. You might not be led by Pop Mart, but you’ll be influenced by other social narratives—it's the same.
All this isn’t to tell you to rush to support anyone now, but to illustrate a principle:
When analyzing companies and moats, don’t stay at the surface data or rely solely on past experience.
You might not follow all companies, like the ones mentioned today—Pop Mart and Moutai—and many classmates might not follow either. That’s okay.
But for the companies and products you do care about, you must have enough in-depth analysis skills.
Don’t impulsively bet, then regret when the short-term price performance isn’t good.
Who can really cut you? It’s your own ignorance—your inability to understand, see through, or choose correctly.
That’s how the market works. If you don’t win, others will.